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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joseph Luther Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery. The district
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. Mr. Jacobs filed
an untimely notice of appeal. He also filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule
35) motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied.
Mr. Jacobs subsequently began the present post-conviction proceeding. In his
amended petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Jacobs asserted that he was entitled to
post-conviction relief because his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. In
Count One of the amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental
health evaluation. If the district court had received another mental health assessment
containing additional evidence concerning Mr. Jacobs' mental health, that would have
affected the district court's sentencing and Rule 35 decisions.

In Count Two of the

amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of
counsel because his trial counsel had not filed a timely appeal, although he had
informed his trial counsel that he wanted to file an appeal of his sentence.
The district court gave notice of its intent to dismiss Count One of the amended
petition. Mr. Jacobs submitted a reply to the notice of intent to dismiss. In the reply, he
reiterated that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel because of his trial
counsel's failure to challenge his original mental health evaluation. He also asserted
that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence
that would require vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The district court
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rejected those assertions and summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of the
amended petition.

The parties then stipulated that there was good cause to grant

Mr. Jacobs relief on Count Two of the amended petition, and the district court held that
he was entitled to reentry of judgment in the underlying criminal case and to file a timely
appeal in that case.
On appeal, Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred in summarily
dismissing with prejudice Count One of the amended petition, because he presented
prima facie evidence that newly discovered evidence required vacation of the sentence
in the interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence that there had been ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to challenge his original mental
health evaluation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jacobs pleaded guilty to one count of felony robbery, and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.4, 51-53.) He
filed an untimely notice of appeal. (R., p.53 & n.3.) He then filed an Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of his sentence, which the district court denied.
(R., pp.53-54.)
Mr. Jacobs subsequently filed, prose, a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief.

(R., pp.4-12.)

After Mr. Jacobs requested the appointment of counsel, the

district court appointed counsel to represent him in all proceedings involving the postconviction petition. (R., pp.13-16, 22.) The State then filed an Answer to Petition for
Post Conviction Relief.

(R., pp.24-27.)

Mr. Jacobs requested leave to amend his

petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court granted. (R., pp.47-50.)
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In his Verified Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Jacobs asserted
that he was entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance.

(Confidential Exs., pp.2-9.) 1

In Count One of the amended

petition, he asserted that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel "in the
processes of his sentencing and Rule 35 of his case and on newly discovered
information related to the same." (Confidential Exs., p.3.) Mr. Jacobs's I.C. § 19-2524
mental health evaluation concluded that he "does not currently meet criteria for mental
health diagnosis."

(Confidential Exs., p.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

Mr. Jacobs did not have adequate time to fully discuss his mental health evaluation, the
presentence report, or the sentencing process with his trial counsel. (Confidential Exs.,
p.3.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel stated that she disagreed
with his mental health evaluation "because my lay opinion is that this is a young man
who also suffered from some significant depression issues."

(Confidential Exs., p.4

(internal quotation marks omitted).) Mr. Jacobs contended that, while his trial counsel
stated that she had concerns with the accuracy of his mental health evaluation, she
made no efforts to obtain another mental health assessment or advise Mr. Jacobs that
he could seek an independent mental health assessment.

(Confidential Exs., p.4.)

Similarly, when his trial counsel filed the Rule 35 motion, she did not speak with
Mr. Jacobs about obtaining an independent mental health assessment, and she did not
offer any factual basis to argue against the original mental health evaluation.

The Verified Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief was filed under seal
pursuant to I.C.A.R. 32(i). (Confidential Exs., p.2.)
1
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(Confidential Exs., pp.4-5.)

Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel also did not try to obtain

information from Mr. Jacobs's mother regarding his mental health history. (Confidential
Exs., p.5.)
Mr. Jacobs noted that his Comprehensive Mental Health Evaluation, completed
at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) after sentencing, stated, "His thoughts [and]
speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his sentencing and
crime.

He is less likely to reach out to others as evidenced by past psycho-social

[history] for professional advice or help.

Some of this may relate to culture."

(Confidential Exs., p.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original);

see

Confidential Exs., pp.59-60.) Further, the ICC mental health assessment stated, "He
struggles with interpersonal skills but he appears to have good self-management [and]
high level of intellect ... Inmate is capable of making informed / educated decisions.
This said, it is possible that [Inmate's] judgment could have been impacted [and]
compromised in a homeless [and] unsteady environment." (Confidential Exs., pp.5-6
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original);

see Confidential Exs., p.60.)

Thus, Mr. Jacobs asserted that his trial counsel, "in failing to challenge the
mental health assessment and by failing to advise that Petitioner could challenge the
mental health assessment both at the time of sentencing and in making his Rule 35
motion, was ineffective as Petitioner's counsel."

(Confidential Exs., p.6.)

If his trial

counsel had "adequately advised Petitioner and taken reasonable steps to obtain
another mental health evaluation and Petitioner's mental health history, Petitioner's
mental health at the time of the crime and at sentencing would have come forth and
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would have aided Petitioner in his sentencing and/or Rule 35 Motion." (Confidential
Exs., p.6.)
In Count Two of the amended petition, Mr. Jacobs asserted that there had been
ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had not filed a timely appeal,
although Mr. Jacobs had informed his trial counsel that he wanted to file an appeal of
his sentence. (Confidential Exs., pp.6-7.)
In the amended petition's prayer for relief, Mr. Jacobs requested that he be
resentenced and allowed an opportunity to present an independent mental health
evaluation and history, and that he be allowed to file an appeal of his sentence in the
underlying criminal case. (Confidential Exs., p.7.)
The district court then filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, informing Mr. Jacobs
that it intended to dismiss Count One of the amended petition.

(R., pp.51-62.)

According to the district court, Count One raised the question of "whether the petitioner
at or before the time of sentencing had a mental illness or mental health disorder that
was not properly diagnosed in the MHA [(mental health assessment)] submitted for the
[court's] consideration for sentencing," as well as "whether the petitioner having
submitted to another MHA would have [been] properly diagnosed [with] a previously
undiagnosed mental condition or disorder that would have been relevant at the time of
sentencing or at the time of his Rule 35 motion." (R., p.56.)
The district court mentioned that the original mental health evaluation considered
at the time of sentencing determined that Mr. Jacobs was not suffering from any mental
illness at the time of the evaluation. (R., pp.56-57.) The district court then stated that
the mental health assessments performed at ICC, while they reported that Mr. Jacobs's
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"thoughts and speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his
sentencing and crime," found that he presented with "stable mental health" and
concluded that he had no need for a further mental health referral. (R., p.57 (internal
quotation marks omitted);

see Confidential Exs., pp.59-60, 63-65.)

The original mental health evaluation considered by the district court recognized
"the 'psychosocial stressors' that the petitioner may have been experiencing at the time
of the crime, i.e., homelessness, lack of money, and inability to maintain employment."
(R., pp.57-58.)

At sentencing, the district court "acknowledged that it is likely

[Mr. Jacobs] was depressed over the lack of money and a job, but the court also
indicated that situation was the result of the petitioner's own actions and not the result of
any mental illness." (R., p.58.)
The district court stated that "there is no legal or factual showing that the [mental
health] evaluation was in error or that it was not properly performed." (R., p.59.) The
district court then determined: "The fact that counsel did not advise the petitioner to
obtain another MHA is not deficient performance since there is no showing that
presently that counsel knew of should have known of additional information that would
have altered or changed the lack of a diagnoses of a mental illness." (R., p.59.) The
ICC mental health assessments confirmed "that he does not have a diagnosis of mental
illness, other than some 'psychosocial stressors' that were noted in the original MHA
used at sentencing." (R, p.59.)
With regard to the requirement that Mr. Jacobs show that he was prejudiced by
his trial counsel's failure to order another mental health assessment, the district court
stated that he would have the "burden to prove that had a second MHA had been
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ordered that the results of the MHA would have been altered or change[d] the sentence
imposed by the court or that his Rule 35 motion would have been granted." (R., p.59.)
The district court determined that it had the same information that it considered during
sentencing and at the time of the denial of the Rule 35 motion, and thus "[Mr. Jacobs's]
'depression' was not the product of any mental illness or condition, it was the product of
his own making .... " (R., p.60.) The district court concluded that Mr. Jacobs "has
failed to present a prima facie case that counsel's performance at sentencing or her
presentation of the Rule 35 Motion was prejudicial." (R., p.60.)
Later, Mr. Jacobs filed a timely Petitioner's Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
(R., pp.71-78.) Mr. Jacobs asserted that he "has set forth a sufficient factual basis to
show that Petitioner's underlying attorney was ineffective and that newly discovered
evidence establishes facts that would have made an effect at Petitioner's sentencing."
(R., p.72.)

Alongside the assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

challenging the original mental health evaluation, Mr. Jacobs asserted that he was
entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence that would
require vacating the sentence in the interest of justice. (R., pp.72-73.)
With respect to the newly discovered evidence assertion, Mr. Jacobs asserted
that the new information offered by the ICC mental health assessments was two-fold:
"(1) that Petitioner's judgment could have been impacted and compromised in a
homeless and unsteady environment; and (2) that Petitioner's culture and other factors
relate to Petitioner's inability to seek help with psycho-social stressors." (R., pp.73-74.)
Nothing in the original mental health evaluation "discusses the effect of the
psychological stressors on the Petitioner's judgment at the time of the crime."
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(R., p.74.) Thus, the information that Mr. Jacobs's psychosocial stressors could have

impacted and compromised his judgment was new information relative to the sentence.
(R., p.74.)

Likewise, the information on Mr. Jacobs's culture and its influence on his

inability to seek help with his psychosocial stressors was new information. (R., pp.7475.)

Mr. Jacobs asserted that the new information was relevant to sentencing
because it showed that the original mental health evaluation considered by the district
court was incomplete, and it would have provided adequate grounds for the district court
to find that treatment would rehabilitate him.

(R., pp.75-76.)

Thus, "Petitioner has

established sufficient facts [so] as to justify proceeding forward in this matter."
(R., p.76.)
With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel assertion in Count One,
Mr. Jacobs asserted that he could proceed because he had shown that his trial
counsel's performance was deficient and that he had been prejudiced by that deficient
performance.

(R., p.76;

see R., p.72.)

His trial counsel had recognized that the

information contained in the mental health evaluation considered by the district court
was deficient or incorrect. (R., pp.76-77.) The deficiency existed because "the mental
health evaluation fails to recognize a change of the Petitioner's mindset and inability to
render effective judgment at the time Petitioner committed his crime." (R., pp.77-78.)
Thus, Mr. Jacobs requested that the post-conviction proceedings continue on
Count One of the amended petition, and that the district court hold a hearing on the
matter for all issues raised. (R., p.78.)
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The district court subsequently issued an Order Partially Dismissing Amended
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.79-83.) On the newly discovered evidence
assertion, the district court concluded that Mr. Jacobs had not met his burden of
showing that the district court had false, incomplete, or otherwise materially misleading
information at the time of sentencing. (R., p.80.) The ICC mental health assessments
and the original mental health evaluation were "substantially similar in their assessment"
of Mr. Jacobs. (R., p.80.) Further, "[t]he fact remains that the defendant does not have
any diagnosis of mental illness." (R., p.80.) Mr. Jacobs was not suffering from a mental
illness when he committed the crime or at the time of sentencing. (R., p.81.) Thus,
even if Mr. Jacobs's trial counsel had formally objected to the original mental health
evaluation and obtained another mental health assessment featuring the information
offered in support of the amended petition, "the sentence imposed by the court would
not have been different nor would this court have granted the Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence." (R., p.81.)
On the ineffective assistance of counsel argument, the district court concluded
that Mr. Jacobs "has failed to present a triable issue of fact as to [Count One] that
counsel was deficient in failing to object to the Mental Health Evaluation or in failing to
obtain a new Mental Health Evaluation for the Rule 35 motion." (R., p.81.) According to
the district court, "the psychological evaluations submitted in support of the amended
petition for post-conviction relief are not materially different from the one relied upon at
the time of sentencing." (R., p.81.) "Assuming that counsel were deficient (which is not
the case herein), based on the evidence presented the petitioner has failed to establish
any triable issue of fact as to the issue of prejudice." (R., p.81.)
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Thus, the district court dismissed with prejudice Count One of the amended
petition.

(R., p.82.)

The district court stated, "The only remaining issue for the

evidentiary hearing is counsel's failure to file a timely notice of appeal." (R., p.82.)
The parties then stipulated that there was good cause to grant Mr. Jacobs relief
for Count Two of the amended petition, on the basis that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a timely appeal. (R., pp.88-89.) The
district court issued a Judgment dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of the amended
petition, and granting Count Two. (R., pp.90-91.) The district court held that Mr. Jacobs
was entitled to the relief of the reentry of the judgment in the underlying criminal case,
and that he had the right to file a timely appeal in that case. (R., pp.90-91.)
Later, Mr. Jacobs filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.94-96.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, with prejudice, Count One of
Mr. Jacobs' amended petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed, With Prejudice, Count One Of
Mr. Jacobs' Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

A

Introduction
Mr. Jacobs asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed, with

prejudice, Count One of the amended petition, because he presented prima facie
evidence that newly discovered evidence required the vacation of the sentence in the
interest of justice, as well as prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel
on

the

basis of his trial counsel's failure to challenge the

original

mental

health evaluation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"An application for post-conviction relief under the Uniform Post Conviction

Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903
(2007). Like any other civil plaintiff, a petitioner for post-conviction relief must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations upon which the application for
post-conviction relief is based. Id. However, unlike a complaint in a normal civil action,
"an application for post-conviction relief must include affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not
included." Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
petitioner's evidence has not raised a genuine issue of material fact. I.C. § 19-4906(b)
and (c).

"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing," an appellate court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact
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exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits
on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party."

Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.

"A court is required to accept the

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's
conclusions." Id. "When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the applicant to
relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary hearing."
Id.

"Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief

when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do
not justify relief as a matter of law." Id. But if genuine and material factual issues have
been raised, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906.
Ne/Isch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430 (Ct. App. 1992).
Put otherwise, "[a] petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary
dismissal if the petition has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as
to each element of the claim upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof."
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583 (2000).

C.

Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence That Newly Discovered Evidence
Required Vacation Of The Sentence In The Interest Of Justice
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence that newly discovered

evidence required vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice. The ICC mental
health assessments raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary
dismissal, because they set forth evidence of material facts that would require vacation
of his sentence under I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4).
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Post-conviction relief is available where the application shows "[t]hat there exists
evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of
the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice." I.C. § 19-4901(a)(4). "An applicant
must present evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would have
been relevant to the sentencing process and that indicate the information available to
the parties or the trial court at the time of sentencing was false, incomplete, or otherwise
materially misleading." Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 440 (Ct. App. 2007).
The ICC mental health assessments report that Mr. Jacobs' "thoughts and
speech indicate a lot of psychosocial stressors as it pertains to his sentencing and
crime. . . .

[l]t is possible that [Mr. Jacobs'] judgment could have been impacted [and]

compromised in a homeless [and] unsteady environment."

(Confidential Exs., p.60.)

Thus, they contain evidence of facts that existed at the time of sentencing that would
have been relevant to the sentencing process and indicate the information available to
the trial court at the time of sentence was incomplete. See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440.
The facts in the ICC mental health assessments would have been relevant to the
sentencing process.

When the district court rejected Mr. Jacobs' newly discovered

evidence assertion, it stated, "While it is true that [Mr. Jacobs] was suffering from
'psychosocial stressors' at and prior to the commission of the crime due to his breakup
with his girlfriend, lack of employment and his homelessness, these stressors do not
excuse, mitigate or justify [Mr. Jacobs'] premeditation and planning of the crime to which
he pied guilty to." (R., p.80.) However, the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment was
impacted and compromised by his psychosocial stressors is a mitigating factor. Without
those stressors affecting his judgment, Mr. Jacobs would be less likely to repeat the
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offense. Additionally, the stressors' effect on his judgment indicates that Mr. Jacobs
could be rehabilitated if those stressors were removed or ameliorated. Thus, because
the possibility that Mr. Jacobs' judgment was impacted and compromised by his
psychosocial stressors is a mitigating factor, the ICC mental health assessments would
have been relevant to the sentencing process.
The facts in the ICC mental health assessments also indicate the information
available to the trial court at the time of sentencing was incomplete. The presentence
investigation report and the original mental health evaluation discussed Mr. Jacobs'
psychosocial stressors. (Confidential Exs., pp.14, 17, 29, 31.) However, the evidence
that Mr. Jacobs' psychosocial stressors could have impacted and compromised his
judgment simply was not presented in the presentence investigation report or the
original mental health evaluation. (See Confidential Exs., pp.10-19, 26-32.) Thus, the
information available to the trial court at the time of sentencing was incomplete.
In sum, the ICC mental health assessments contained evidence of facts that
existed at the time of sentencing that would have been relevant to the sentencing
process and indicate the information available to the trial court at the time of sentence
was incomplete. Mr. Jacobs has demonstrated the existence of "evidence of material
facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest of justice."

See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 440.

Mr. Jacobs

therefore presented evidence establishing a prima facie case that he is entitled to postconviction relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, which is sufficient to survive
summary dismissal.

See Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583.

Because Mr. Jacobs set forth

evidence of material facts that would require the vacation of his sentence under

15

I.C. § 19-4901 (a)(4), the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Count One
with respect to the newly discovered evidence assertion.

See Knutsen, 144 Idaho

at 442.
Thus, Mr. Jacobs is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he
can demonstrate that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires a resentencing hearing. See id. at 444. The district court's
order summarily dismissing Count One of the amended petition should be reversed, and
the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Mr. Jacobs is
entitled to resentencing in light of the ICC mental health assessments. See id.

D.

Mr. Jacobs Presented Prima Facie Evidence Of The Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel Based On His Trial Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Original Mental
Health Evaluation
Mr. Jacobs asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective

assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental
health evaluation. A petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel will "survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner
establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance was
deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced
petitioner's case." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho at 583.
The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the State of Idaho is
guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617 (2011). An
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may properly be brought under the UPCPA. Id.
Under the two-part Strickland test, "[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
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claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that
the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004)). To establish
a deficiency, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 (2010). To
establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the trial would have been different but for the attorney's deficient performance. Id.
Mr. Jacobs asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to challenge the original mental health evaluation.

"An ineffective assistance claim

based on counsel's failure to present evidence cannot satisfy the deficient performance
or resulting prejudice prongs without providing the substance of the potential testimony
or other admissible evidence of facts counsel should have discovered and presented."
Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443.

Mr. Jacobs has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his trial
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable in failing to challenge the original
mental health evaluation.

As discussed above, the evidence from the ICC mental

health assessments indicated that Mr. Jacobs' judgment could have been impacted and
compromised by his psychosocial stressors. (Confidential Exs., p.60.) This evidence
would have been pertinent to the district court's examination of the mitigating factors
during sentencing and while ruling on the Rule 35 motion. The evidence from the ICC
mental health assessments could have been presented at those junctures, had
Mr. Jacobs' trial counsel challenged the original mental health evaluation and obtained
another mental health assessment.

Thus, Mr. Jacobs' trial counsel's failure to
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challenge the original mental health evaluation "raises a material question regarding the
vigor and competence of his counsel's representation." See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443.
Mr. Jacobs also raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental health
evaluation.

The prejudice prong of the Strickland test only "requires a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's inadequate performance, the outcome would have
been different." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443. "A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The possibility that Mr. Jacobs'
judgment could have been impacted and compromised by his psychosocial stressors
would have served as an important mitigating factor for Mr. Jacobs' sentence. There is
a reasonable probability that evidence would have prompted the district court to impose
a lesser sentence. See id. at 444. Thus, the district court erred in denying Mr. Jacobs
an evidentiary hearing on whether his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to challenge the original mental health evaluation.
In short, Mr. Jacobs presented prima facie evidence of the ineffective assistance
of counsel based on his trial counsel's failure to challenge the original mental health
evaluation. See Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho at 583. The evidence that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him is sufficient to survive
summary judgment.

See Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 444. The district court erred when it

summarily dismissed Count One with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel
assertion. See id.
Thus, the district court's order summarily dismissing Count One should be
reversed, and the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether
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Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing in light of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance.
Seeid.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Jacobs respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the district court's order summary dismissing, with prejudice, Count One of his amended
petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on
whether Mr. Jacobs is entitled to resentencing.
DATED this 28 th day of October, 2013.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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